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This paper examines the relationship among gender, social capital, and access to finance of micro, small,
and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector in Viet Nam. Our dataset is from the 2011, 2013, and
2015 results of the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Survey in Viet Nam. Using the Heckman tech-
nique to control for sample selection bias, the estimates do not provide evidence for discrimination
against female-owned enterprises in the formal lending market. Specifically, female entrepreneurs have
a higher probability of getting a loan and they pay lower interest rates in comparison with male entre-
preneurs. No discrimination in formal credit markets may arise from the preference for informal loans
over formal loans as entrepreneurs tend to borrow informal loans before applying for formal ones.
Further analysis shows that social capital could facilitate loan applications: firms that have a closer rela-
tionship with government officials and other business people can get loans of longer duration.
 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Access to finance is considered as one of the main drivers of
firms’ growth. However, firms, especially small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs), often report a lack of access to finance. This prevents
firms from growing to their full potential and slows down eco-
nomic development. Furthermore, if firms fail to gain loans from
formal sources, they have to use their own funds or informal credit
sources, which results in limited credit and paying higher interest
rates. The issue of financial constraints is even more pronounced
among female-owned enterprises because of gender-based stereo-
types (Godwin, Stevens, & Brenner, 2006). Thus, a growing litera-
ture on female entrepreneurship has examined gender
differences in credit markets and factors that can facilitate women
entrepreneurs’ access to finance.
However, results from systematic literature review have shown
that the existing studies on female entrepreneurship face a number
of challenges (e.g., De Bruin, Brush, & Welter, 2006, 2007). The first
challenge is related to methodological shortcomings such as the
issue of sample selection bias (Blanchard, Zhao, & Yinger, 2008).
Although several studies have attempted to address this problem
(e.g., Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, & Wolken, 2002; Cavalluzzo &
Wolken, 2005), choice of instruments is still one of the key chal-
lenges. We aim to contribute to the literature by introducing the
alternative instruments accounting for the household and family
background of female entrepreneurs which is an important factor
in entrepreneurial research (Ahl, 2006; Brush, De Bruin, &
Welter, 2009).
Secondly, existing studies conducted within a single-country
context are limited to the US where there are strong anti-
discriminatory policies. Hence, results from these explorations
might not be relevant to other countries such as developing econo-
mies where gender inequality remains a problem in the society.
Given the increasingly important role of emerging markets, there
is a need for research on female entrepreneurship and gender dif-
ferences in these countries (Hughes, Jennings, Brush, Carter, &
Welter, 2012). This study is designed to meet this demand by
investigating financial constraints faced by female entrepreneurs
in the context of an emerging country.
Viet Nam represents an appropriate field of study for a number
of reasons. First, despite the significant growth of SMEs in the
economy, many SMEs in Viet Nam face difficulties in raising exter-
nal finance, especially funds from formal sources. According to the
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys for Viet Nam (World Bank, 2015),
access to finance is one of the top business obstacles for firms. Sec-
ond, Viet Nam is a network-oriented economy, where social capital
plays an important role in running business (Meyer & Nguyen,
2005). Collectivism and the value of group membership are more
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important than individualism in Vietnamese culture (Swierczek,
1994). This therefore makes Viet Nam an interesting case for inves-
tigating the impact of social networks on obtaining finance. Third,
although the gender gap in Viet Nam has been narrowed, gender
inequality still remains in the society and in the economy (World
Bank, 2016).
This study offers an in-depth understanding of obstacles in the
financing of SMEs in Viet Nam in general and female-owned SMEs
in particular, which may help firms get better access to finance in
the future and guide policy implications. First, firms could invest in
their social capital, particularly in their relationship with govern-
ment officials, bankers, and business networks, to facilitate loan
applications. Second, women-owned firms could extend the part-
nership with male-owned firms to benefit from male entrepre-
neurs’ social capital. Third, credit programs targeting SMEs with
low interest rates and longer loan maturity terms might be
expanded. This is because the current lending programs for SMEs
are limited to specific sectors and conditions that discourage SMEs
from borrowing from the formal sector.
Our paper provides new evidence for the issue of financial con-
straints regarding the effect of female ownership and the role of
social capital in a developing country context. More specifically,
we do not observe the presence of discrimination against women
entrepreneurs by Vietnamese financial institutions. This result is
in line with previous studies which found that there is no differ-
ence in loan approval rates between male- and female-owned
firms (Blanchflower, Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003; Cavalluzzo &
Cavalluzzo, 1998; Madill, Riding, & Haines, 2006). This study also
sheds light on the relationship between social capital and access
to finance that better social capital may partially help firms relax
their financial constraints (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Le,
Venkatesh, & Nguyen, 2006; Talavera, Xiong, & Xiong, 2012). For
instance, firms with better social networks are more likely to have
access to longer loan terms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section reviews the related literature about discrimination, social
capital, and access to finance. Section 3 provides an overview of
institutional frameworks of SMEs in Viet Nam. Section 4 presents
the descriptive statistics and the identification strategy. Section 5
provides the main empirical results and robustness checks. Sec-
tion 6 concludes and provides the policy implications.
2. Literature review
(a) Studies on discrimination
(i) Gender discrimination
The economics of discrimination has been well developed in the
past few decades and can be divided into two main models: a
taste-based model and a statistical model. These models can be
distinguished through the causes, nature, and economic effects.
The taste-based preference model, or Becker-type model of dis-
crimination, has suggested that discrimination arises from a per-
sonal prejudice, or taste, against certain individuals or groups
(Becker, 1957). Thus, individuals who hold a taste for discrimina-
tion against a particular class of people are willing to pay a finan-
cial price to avoid interactions with that class. In the lending
market context, this can be implied by higher interest rates
charged to the disadvantaged group, i.e., lenders require an interest
rate premium to compensate for having to associate with the dis-
advantaged group. Discrimination in the lending markets can also
be demonstrated through fewer loans being held by disadvantaged
borrowers.
From the statistical perspective, discrimination against women
might arise from the fact that women-owned firms tend to have
smaller amount of equity capital (Riding & Swift, 1990; Verheul
& Thurik, 2001). Consequently, loan approval is problematic as
banks are often reluctant to lend to low-capital firms (Coleman,
2000). Further, statistical discrimination can also be the result of
imperfect information. Lack of information leads to stereotypes
that group-level characteristics can be proxies for characteristics
of individuals belonging to that group (Arrow, 1973; Phelps,
1972). Hence, individuals can be treated differently depending on
what groups they belong to. Regarding lending markets, statistical
discrimination may be induced when lenders are imperfectly
informed about some borrower characteristics that are relevant
to decision making. Moreover, acquiring information is costly.
Thus, lenders tend to use characteristics of the applicants’ groups
when making loan decisions.
Recent research on discrimination has employed the intersec-
tionality approach that considers both between- and intra-group
differences in documenting gender inequality. It is suggested that
discrimination against women might be a combination of gender
bias and other demographic characteristics such as race, ethnicity,
or social status. For example, Beal (2008) has found that Black
women face a higher level of discrimination compared to White
women because they face both gender and racial biases. Addition-
ally, working-class Black females suffer from triple discrimination
including race, gender, and poverty. The interaction between gen-
der and ethnicity could also lead to more harassment at work
experienced by minority women as they belong to both disadvan-
taged groups (Berdahl & Moore, 2006).
(ii) Gender discrimination and access to finance
A growing economic literature investigates the presence of gen-
der discrimination in the credit markets in the context of devel-
oped countries and provides an ambiguous picture. For example,
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) have acknowledged that female-owned
firms in the US tend to have higher loan denial rates in comparison
with male-owned peers. Further, men-owned businesses are more
likely to get larger loans and pay lower interest rates compared to
women-owned businesses (Alesina, Lotti, & Mistrulli, 2013;
Coleman, 2000; Treichel & Scott, 2006). However, other studies
did not observe discrimination against women in lending markets
(e.g., Blanchflower et al., 2003; Bostic & Lampani, 1999; Madill
et al., 2006). Asiedu, Freeman, and Nti-Addae (2012) have found
that White women-owned firms pay lower interest rates compared
to White men-owned peers. Additionally, despite the lower num-
ber of loans held by female entrepreneurs, there is no difference
in loan denial rates between female- and male-owned firms
(Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo, 1998). Moreover, female-owned busi-
nesses located in more concentrated banking markets indeed have
more benefits in relation to loan applications compared to their
male-owned counterparts.
Limited studies about gender discrimination in the context of
developing countries also provide mixed results. For example,
there is no evidence for gender discrimination in access to finance
in Trinidad and Tobago (Storey, 2004). Documenting women’s dis-
advantages in raising external capital in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone (2013) have suggested that the gender
gap in lending markets can be explained by firms’ characteristics
and selection bias rather than by pure gender discrimination. More
specifically, women-owned firms tend to be smaller, resulting in
lower probability of getting loans. Further analysis shows that
female entrepreneurs face higher barriers in loan applications in
the first place compared to male peers. Focusing on credit access
differentials between men- and women-owned manufacturing
enterprises, Hansen and Rand (2014) have found evidence for gen-
der discrimination against women for medium-sized firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa while the opposite results are found for small enter-
prises. Furthermore, female-owned firms in Sub-Saharan Africa are
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more likely to face financial constraints compared to male-owned
firms (Asiedu, Kalonda-Kanyama, Ndikumana, & Nti-Addae, 2013).
Employing a cross-country sample, Muravyev, Talavera, and
Schäfer (2009) have observed the existence of gender discrimina-
tion in the credit markets: firms owned by female entrepreneurs
experience higher denial rates and pay higher interest rates. How-
ever, the discrimination differs across countries. Female-owned
firms in more financially developed countries are more likely to
get loans and receive lower collateral requirements compared to
those in less developed countries. These inconclusive results might
be explained by country-specific characteristics like different
levels of gender inequality (Bandiera & Natraj, 2013) or different
levels of female entrepreneurship (Baughn, Chua, & Neupert,
2006).
(b) Studies on social capital
(i) Social capital and access to finance
Issues related to the role of social capital have been docu-
mented with reference to different types of networks: networks
with government officials and bankers, business-related networks
(e.g., networks with customers and suppliers or membership in
business associations), networks with social organizations or net-
works with relatives and friends. A better social embeddedness is
indicated by the higher number of ties in the networks such as
being a member of more business associations (Nguyen & Luu,
2013). Better social capital could be also shown through the close-
ness with the network ties like having frequent contacts and inter-
actions (Davidsson & Honig, 2003).
These types of networks can affect firms’ access to finance in
different ways. For example, Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) have doc-
umented that the relationship with government officials is posi-
tively related to venture capital financing in East-Asian transition
countries. This can be explained by the considerable power and
influence of government officials in project approval and resource
allocation (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Furthermore, it has been doc-
umented that asymmetric information is the major problem in
undeveloped financial markets (Nguyen, Le, & Freeman, 2006). To
learn more about loan applicants, bankers might seek extra infor-
mation from the relevant government officials or applicants’ other
networks. As a result, firms with stronger social ties are more likely
to get loans or get better loan terms (Le & Nguyen, 2009; O’Connor,
2000; Tenev, Carlier, Chaudry, & Nguyen, 2003). Examining a sam-
ple of 282 Argentinean entrepreneurs, Fornoni, Arribas, and Vila
(2012) have acknowledged that social capital can facilitate firms’
access to finance. The positive impact of the relationship with
key customers on venture capital financing is also found in
Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006). Moreover, membership of a business
association or political party is one way of spreading knowledge
about a firm’s existence, as well as being an indicator of reputation
(Coleman, 1988). This, in turn, may also help firms gain access to
credit. Talavera et al. (2012) have shown that in China, the owners’
Communist Party membership is positively related to the probabil-
ity of getting loans from state-owned banks. Furthermore, they
found that business associations can assist private enterprises with
commercial bank loan applications by recommending good enter-
prises to banks.
Nevertheless, some studies suggested that firms with better
social networks are less likely to rely on bank financing. Le
et al. (2006) have shown that close ties with government officials
may help firms get financial support from the government and
therefore firms may no longer need bank loans. Similarly, it might
be the case that a close relationship among firms, suppliers, and
customers could promote trade credit that distorts the need for
funding from formal sector. For instance, trade credit is quite
common in Viet Nam with 57% of ongoing customer relationships
and 53% of ongoing supplier relationships having some sort of
trade credit (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). Another argument is
that firms might rely on informal loans instead of formal ones
as informal loans from family and friends are more convenient,
with lower interest rates, longer duration, and no collateral or
guarantee requirements. Hussain, Millman, and Matlay (2006)
have also observed that SMEs in China rely exclusively on finan-
cial support from their immediate family at the start-up stage and
also during the development of firms. The reliance of SMEs on
informal loans is also documented in Viet Nam. For example,
Nguyen et al. (2006) have found that informal loans are the prin-
cipal sources of external finance of many private SMEs. As a
result, social networks lead to a reduction in the need and use
of formal credit (Le & Nguyen, 2009).
(ii) Gender inequality in social capital
Males and females do not acquire social networks uniformly
because former have advantages over latter in terms of social cap-
ital. Particularly, men tend to have greater business and official-
related networks while family and friends often dominate
women’s social networks (Marsden, 1987; Moore, 1990;
Stenbacka & Tillberg Mattsson, 2009). The large difference in the
proportion of kin in males’ and females’ networks remains even
if other factors such as employment, family, and wage are taken
into account. Moreover, men are more likely to be the member
of large business or economic associations. By contrast, women
are more exposed to the groups of domestic and community rela-
tionships (McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1982). There is also evidence
for gender bias within a network as individuals tend to select
themselves into same-sex networks. For instance, males often
enter male-dominated organizations while females are more likely
to join female-dominated associations (Straits, 1998). These differ-
ences in men’s and women’s network structures could be
explained by the gender differences in networking ability and
skills. More specifically, women are less willing to invest in social
capital compared to men (Jensen, 2014; Moog & Backes-Gellner,
2009). Further, gender stereotypes, structural position, and mem-
bership in a minority group could also prevent women from net-
working efficiently (Timberlake, 2005).
Additionally, men benefit from their networks more than
women do. Advice achieved through networking could improve
growth expectancy of Bulgarian male-owned firms but not those
owned by females (Manolova, Carter, Manev, & Gyoshev, 2007).
Similarly, better social capital is positively related to men’s career
development (Dreher & Cox, 1996, 2000). For example, entrepre-
neurial networks could help senior men but not women get early
promotion (Burt, 1998). However, there is evidence that females
could benefit from men’s heterogeneous networks through
male–female partnership (Godwin et al., 2006). In particular,
female entrepreneurs who partner with men could diversify their
networks with a higher number of non-kin contacts such as busi-
ness contacts or contacts with higher status persons. As a result,
women entrepreneurs would have access to a wider range of
information and opportunities that are important to the success
in business.
3. Vietnamese SMEs’ institutional framework
Since the Doi moi (Reform) policy came into effect in 1986, Viet
Nam has achieved remarkable results in socio-economic develop-
ment. Liberalization of the economy and adoption of the market
economy have resulted in a significant increase in private enter-
prises. The introduction of micro, small, and medium enterprises
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in Viet Nam has followed the approval of the Law on Enterprises in
2000.1 Since then, SMEs in Viet Nam have grown dramatically.
According to the White Book on SMEs in 2009, from 2000 to 2008,
the average registered capital of small and medium enterprises
increased by around eight times. The increases were
USD68,714.29, USD196,250.00, USD506,250.00, and USD543,750.00
in 2000, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively.2
As Viet Nam has been undergoing an economic transition pro-
cess toward a market economy with a socialist orientation, obsta-
cles to the development of the private sector remain. Many SMEs
report that financial constraint is one of the major difficulties for
firms (World Bank, 2016) and they, therefore, need to seek external
capital such as formal loans, government financial support, or
informal credit from different sources. Given that the Vietnamese
banking sector is heavily regulated, government officials at all
levels still have considerable influence on banking operations.
Moreover, since the late 1990s, the Vietnamese government has
provided financial support programs—so-called ‘policy loans’—
which have been channeled through the state-run Social Policy
Bank and Viet Nam Development Bank. Thus, SMEs can make use
of their close ties with government officials to facilitate commer-
cial loan applications and get access to these support programs.
Other credit sources widely used in Viet Nam are: (1) loans from
family and friends; (2) loans from private lenders; and (3) trade
credit from suppliers and customers. Each of these informal credit
sources has its own pros and cons. For example, loans from family
and friends are inexpensive but limited, while loans from private
lenders are costly with high interest rates. Moreover, given that
finding customers is the most critical challenge for Vietnamese
SMEs (Nguyen, Stromseth, Hoang, Nguyen, & Tran, 2002) and the
use of trade credit depends on firms’ creditworthiness, only firms
which already have a good credit history and long-term relation-
ship with suppliers and customers can use trade credit.
In the area of social development, Viet Nam has made some
achievements in narrowing the gender gap (Wells, 2005). Follow-
ing the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality and the
National Strategy on Gender Equality, gender disparities in primary
and secondary education have been reduced. From 2007 to 2016,
the ratio of female/male in educational attainment has increased
from 0.89 to 0.98 (World Economic Forum, 2007, 2016). Further,
women also play an increasingly important role in economics
and politics with the ratios of female/male in economic participa-
tion and political empowerment in 2016 being 0.74 and 0.14,
respectively (World Economic Forum, 2016). However, despite
the government’s efforts to mitigate discrimination against
women, gender inequality still exists in different aspects of eco-
nomic and social life (Oxfam, 2017). For example, according to
the 2009 Labor Force Survey, women’s average wages are about
75% of men’s average wages. The wage disparity seems to be more
severe in rural Viet Nam as women living in rural areas are over-
represented among the poor (Newman, 2017; World Bank, 2016)
while women in urban areas have a higher income level compared
to men (Thuy, Toan, Hien, & Van Trang, 2015). Women are also
exposed to more vulnerable jobs such as own-account work3 and
unpaid family labor (World Bank, 2011). Moreover, women in Viet
Nam are not encouraged to start their own businesses as there is still
resistance to women taking up leadership positions. According to the
2006 National Survey conducted by International Finance Corpora-
tion, women entrepreneurs do face difficulties in seeking external
capital (Greig, Weeks, & Nguyen, 2006). These include: (1) a compli-
cated lending process; (2) high interest rates; and (3) lack of collat-
eral. Although gender discrimination is not reported as a major
difficulty, three per cent of respondents report that they have per-
ceived some sort of discrimination.
Data from the Enterprise Surveys conducted by the World Bank
in 2005, 2009, and 2015 have provided an overview of access to
finance of SMEs in Viet Nam. In general, about 60% of small and
medium enterprises reported that access to finance is an obstacle
for their operation and growth. In terms of level of impact, most
firms judged this to be a moderate or major obstacle. Furthermore,
of those firms that reported they required a loan, the number of
discouraged borrowers made up about 50%. The major reason
given for not applying for a loan was that the application proce-
dures are too complex. Other reasons include: (1) collateral
requirements are too high; (2) interest rates are unfavorable; (3)
the size of loan and maturity are insufficient; and (4) an expecta-
tion that their application would be rejected.
4. Empirical strategy
(a) Data and sample
This study is based on the data from the 2011, 2013, and 2015
results of the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Survey in Viet
Nam. The surveys are conducted by the United Nations University
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-
WIDER) in collaboration with two Vietnamese partners (UNU-
WIDER, 2016). The 2015 survey provides detailed information
about 2,650 formal and informal micro SMEs in the private manu-
facturing sector in nine provinces of Viet Nam.
The surveys consist of three modules: (1) a main enterprise
questionnaire whose respondents are either the owners or man-
agers; (2) an employee questionnaire; and (3) an economic
accounts questionnaire (UNU-WIDER, 2016). In this study, we
focus on (1) the enterprise questionnaire that provides detailed
information on firm performance, enterprise history, employment,
business environment, and owner background characteristics, and
(2) the economic accounts questionnaire which contains informa-
tion on firms’ revenues, costs, assets, and liabilities.
The original sample includes 2,512 firms in 2011, 2,542 firms in
2013, and 2,650 firms in 2015. The data-screening process is as fol-
lows. First, we only include firms whose legal status is household
owned, private/sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability
company, or joint stock company without state control. Second,
for the purpose of our identification strategy, we only keep firms
whose owners are survey respondents. Third, preliminary analysis
shows that some formal loans have either zero interest rates or
zero loan maturity. We denote these interest rate and loan dura-
tion values as missing. Finally, we drop the observations that have
suspicious returns on assets (e.g., ROA > 100%) which could mis-
lead the results if included. After screening, our final sample
includes 4,961 observations in which, the total number of firms
is 1,722, 1,652, and 1,587 in 2011, 2013, and 2015, respectively.4
We follow the loan application process specified in Cole and
Sokolyk (2016). Firms reporting no need for a loan are classified
as non-borrowers. The complementary group (potential borrow-
ers) consists of firms that do not apply because of lending condi-
tions, approval, or process (discouraged) and firms that apply for
loans (loan applicants). The latter group then consists of unsuc-
cessful borrowers, whose applications are rejected, and successful
1 Based on the classification in Government Decree 56/2009/ND-CP, there are two
criteria for defining the type of SME i.e., scale of total assets and annual average
number of employees. Accordingly, micro, small, and medium enterprises in Viet Nam
are firms with less than 10, 10–200, and more than 200–300 employees, respectively.
2 These increases are equivalent to VND0.962 billion, VND3.14 billion, VND8.1
billion, and VND8.7 billion in 2000, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. Historical
exchange rates are taken from https://tradingeconomics.com/vietnam/currency.
3 Own-account workers are entrepreneurs without any employees.
4 According to the classification in Government Decree 56/2009/ND-CP, most firms
participating in the surveys are micro firms.
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borrowers. Panel A of Figure 1 summarizes data on loan applica-
tions across different groups. We observe the presence of non-
borrowers among both male and female business owners in our
sample. In particular, 39.22% of male entrepreneurs do not apply
for formal loans, while this number is 39.80% for females. The share
of discouraged borrowers among male-owned firms is slightly
higher (34.22%) than the share of discouraged borrowers among
female counterparts (32.26%). In terms of loan approval, the
approval rate for male-owned businesses is lower (24.14%) than
the approval rate for female entrepreneurs (26.53%). This differ-
ence could be explained by a number of factors. First, it could be
the case that female-owned firms have better applications, thus
are more likely to obtain loans. Second, women are often perceived
as being less risk-taking than men in making financial decisions
(Dwyer, Gilkeson, & List, 2002), which makes them less risky bor-
rowers. Data from the surveys allow us to identify reasons why
firms in need of external finance do not apply for formal loans.
The top three reasons include: (1) firms do not want to incur debt;
(2) interest rates are too high; and (3) the process is too difficult.
Table 1 displays detailed descriptive statistics for all firms.
Although the number of female-owned firms is lower compared
to male-owned enterprises, still about 28% of the SMEs are owned
by women. The average age of owners is about 50 years and most
are from the ethnic majority. While most owners have completed
high school education, only a few have college or higher education
degrees. Regarding firms’ characteristics, most of firms operate in
less-developed provinces rather than in large developed cities.
Interestingly, we observe that informal loans have longer loan
maturity terms and lower interest rates compared to formal loans.
This suggests that most informal loans in the sample are provided
by family and friends. In addition, from 2011 to 2015, the formal
interest rates charged to SMEs in Viet Nam have dropped steadily
while loan maturity terms have been extended (Panels B-C,
Figure 1).
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics by gender. Male entre-
preneurs tend to have a higher demand for external finance com-
pared to female counterparts. Subsequently, male-owned firms
are more likely to apply for formal loans but are less likely to
obtain one compared to their female counterparts. Furthermore,
we do not observe any significant differences in terms of informal
loan terms between female-owned and male-owned firms while
male-owned firms tend to pay higher formal interest rates.
Regarding social capital, women appear to have better access to
business networks while men are more likely to have close rela-
tionships with government or bank officials. We also observe that
the number of informal loan applications is considerably higher
compared to the number of formal loan applications (Panel D,
Figure 1). The distribution of informal and formal interest rates
charged to SMEs is shown in Figure 2, while the sources of infor-
mal loans are presented in Figure 3. As can be seen, firms can
borrow interest-free loans from family and friends. This, coupled
with the reasons for being discouraged to borrow through formal
loans, possibly explains the domination of informal loans in the
sample.
Figure 1. Differences between male- and female-owned firms in credit needs and formal loan conditions. Notes: This figure shows the differences between male- and female-
owned firms in credit needs and loan conditions. Panel A presents the differences in credit needs as well as formal loan approval rates between female- and male-owned
firms. Panel B compares formal loan maturity (measured in years) of female- and male-owned firms over time. Panel C compares formal loan interest rates (%) charged to
female- and male-owned firms over time. Panel D shows the number of informal and formal loan applications as the share of firms made by female- and male-owned firms.
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Regarding owners’ characteristics, the differences in ethnicity
as well as education level and work experience are quite strong.
Most male business owners are of the ethnic majority and have
higher levels of education compared to women entrepreneurs. Fur-
ther, most of them worked before as waged employees while
women’s previous work is mainly self-employed. While many
male owners are members of the Communist Party or war veter-
ans, this number is small among females. With regard to firms’
characteristics, although men-owned firms are bigger in size, on
average those firms performworse than women-owned firms, with
lower average returns on assets.
(b) Methodology
(i) Loan applications
Previous studies about financial constraints mainly focus on the
probability of obtaining loans and differences in loan terms (e.g.,
Blanchard et al., 2008; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). Unlike those studies,
we first aim to investigate the disparities in loan applications made
by women and men. This analysis is conditional on the need for
loans. As our identification strategy, we employ the probit
response model with sample selection (Van de Ven & Van Praag,
1981). Loan application, a binary variable, is our dependent vari-
able. Our model is as follows:
ProbitðApplyit ¼ 1Þ ¼ /ðaþ bFemaleit þ cSocial capitalit
þ hFemaleit  Social capitalit þ Xitdþ eitÞ
ð1:1Þ
ProbitðNeedit ¼ 1Þ ¼ /ð~aþ ~bFemaleit þ ~cSocial capitalit
þ ~hFemaleit  Social capitalit þ Xit~d
þ ~w1Share of jobsit þ ~w2Innovationit þ ~eitÞ
ð1:2Þ
where i indexes firm and t indexes year; (1.1) is the main equation
while (1.2) is the sample selection equation.
In Eqn. (1.1), Apply takes the value of one if firms apply for a for-
mal loan, zero otherwise. The key variable of our analysis, Female,
is the binary variable indicating whether the owner is female.
Social capital is the dummy variable that equals one if an entrepre-
neur has one of the social networks. Social networks are proxied by
relationship with government/bank officials and relationship with
business people.5 The interaction terms between female and social
network proxies are also included.
Vector X captures firms’ creditworthiness, and other owners’
characteristics that may affect creditors’ decisions. Other charac-
teristics of the owners are captured by: Age (natural logarithm of
the owner’s age); Ethnicity (one if the owner belongs to ethnic
majority, zero otherwise); Education (first component of principal
component analysis of basic education and professional educa-
tion); Veteran/Communist (one if the firm owner is a war veteran
or is a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise); and Pre-
vious wage employee (one if the owner’s previous job is waged
employee, zero otherwise). From the behavioral perspective,
younger owners have greater incentives to take on riskier projects,
therefore, they are less favorable during loan application process.
In addition, owners with higher education levels and more relevant
work experience are expected to manage their firms better. Fur-
thermore, being a member of the Communist Party, being war vet-
eran, or being of the ethnic majority may help firms have better
access to bank loans.
Firms’ characteristics are indicated by Size (natural logarithm of
firm’s assets measured in million VND), Firm age (natural logarithm
of the firm’s age), Export (one if the firm has direct export activity,
zero otherwise), and Accounting (one if the firm follows the
accounting standard in accordance with government guidelines,
zero otherwise). It is widely accepted that a bigger and older firm
may have a better credit history as well as a better reputation and
longer term relationship with creditors. Moreover, firms that
export and maintain a formal accounting book in accordance with
government guidelines are likely to be trustworthy and have
higher chances of getting loans. Return on assets (ROA) proxies
for firms’ profitability, a key factor in firms’ potential to repay from
the point of view of banks. Bad credit history (equals one if the firm
fails to service its debt, zero otherwise) is another main factor that
banks use to screen applicants’ profiles and therefore it is also
included in our regressions.6
In Eqn. (1.2), we consider selection into firms reporting that a
loan is needed. Hence, the main equation identifies the differences
between those who actually need a loan and those who do not
need extra finance. There is an assumption of joint normality and
non-zero correlation q between error terms. If q– 0, the standard
model without selection produces biased and inconsistent
estimates.
Identification of the selection equation requires instruments
that affect the need for a formal loan but do not affect the decision
to apply. In this study, we employ two instruments. It has been
shown that firms tend to use internal finance before seeking exter-
nal finance (Myers, 2000). Moreover, the owner’s private wealth is
found be to one of the main internal finance sources for SMEs (e.g.,
Ughetto, 2008; Vos, Yeh, Carter, & Tagg, 2007). Hence, the first
instrument employed is jobs as share of working-age adults in
the owner’s household (Share of jobs is the ratio of number of jobs
over total number of working-age adults in the household).7,8 More
jobs generating more income can be used as internal finance for
firms, thus reducing the need for external finance. The second instru-
ment is innovation activities of the firms, Innovation, which equals
one if the firm has introduced new technology or new product, zero
otherwise. It has been argued that firms, especially small firms, often
face financial constraints when they conduct research and develop-
ment and innovation projects (e.g., Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006;
Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005). In other words, if the firms adopt
new technology or introduce new products, they will need extra
funding to finance these activities. These instruments are valid since
the final decision as to whether firms apply for a formal loan
depends on other factors. For example, firms might get funding from
informal sources before applying to formal sources.9
(ii) Loan approval
The second part of our analysis focuses on the possible differ-
ences in loan approval rates for female- and male-owned firms.
The dependent variable, Loan approval, equals one if the firm gets
at least one formal loan, zero otherwise. Since this analysis is con-
ditional on actual loan applications, sample selection bias may
arise because some firms may have chosen not to apply for a for-
mal loan in anticipation of being rejected or being offered unfavor-
able loan conditions due to discrimination. Panel A of Figure 1
shows that the discouraged borrowers (firms needing loans but
5 Although business association membership could be important social capital, we
only observe a low proportion of firms that take part in business associations. For this
reason, we do not analyze this aspect of the data.
6 Details of the variables and their definition can be found in Table 1.
7 The working-age range is from 15 to 60.
8 We also decompose jobs in the household into jobs in firms, waged jobs
elsewhere, and self-employed. Our results are quantitatively similar.
9 Descriptive statistics and definition of instruments are shown in Table 7.
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which do not apply) do exist in our sample. To address this prob-
lem, we employ the following model:
ProbitðLoanapprovalit ¼1Þ¼/ðaþbFemaleitþcSocial capitalit
þhFemaleitSocial capitalitþXitdþeitÞ
ð2:1Þ
ProbitðApplyit ¼ 1Þ ¼ /ð~aþ ~bFemaleit þ ~cSocial capitalit
þ ~hFemaleit  Social capitalit þ Xit~d
þ ~wApply for informal loansit þ ~eitÞ ð2:2Þ
where the independent variables in Eqn. (2.1) are defined as the
same way as the ones in Eqn. (1.1).
In the selection Eqn. (2.2), Apply equals one if the firm applies
for a formal loan and zero otherwise. This equation is estimated
for the sample of firms that apply for a bank loan. Again, we need
to find instruments that affect the likelihood of applying for a for-
mal loan but do not affect loan approval. The substitution between
informal credit and formal credit has been well documented in a
number of studies. While informal credit may have a positive
impact on the accessibility of microcredit programs (Khoi, Gan,
Nartea, & Cohen, 2013), informal loans are a type of supplement
to fill the gap left by the formal sector and are preferred (e.g.,
Duong & Izumida, 2002; Guirkinger, 2008). In our sample, we
observe that the number of informal loans is higher than the
number of formal loans while firms reported facing difficulties in
formal loan applications. Thus, we use Apply for informal loan
(equals one if the firm applies for an informal loan, zero otherwise)
as the instrument in this selection. Our argument is, if firms apply
for a loan from informal sources, they are less likely to apply for
loans from formal sources. This instrument is valid, as banks
cannot observe informal loan applications to make decisions on
formal loan applications.
(iii) Loan terms
In the third part of the analysis, we consider the disparities in
loan maturity terms and interest rates charged to female-owned
firms and male-owned firms. Conditional on successful loan appli-
cants, the main equation identifies the differences in loan terms
between successful borrowers and unsuccessful borrowers. Our
empirical model is as follows:
Loan termsit ¼ aþ bFemaleit þ cSocial capitalit þ hFemaleit
 Social capitalit þ Xitdþ eit ð3:1Þ
ProbitðLoanapprovalit ¼1Þ¼/ð~aþ ~bFemaleitþ~cSocial capitalit
þ~hFemaleitSocial capitalitþXit~d
þ ~w1Managerial timeit
þ ~w2Main income sourceitþ ~w3Bribeitþ~eitÞ
ð3:2Þ
In selection Eqn. (3.2), Loan approval equals one if the firm gets
at least one formal loan and zero otherwise. This equation is esti-
mated for the sample of firms applying for a bank loan. In the
model proposed by Kon and Storey (2003), better preparation of
loan applications is one determinant of good applicants. If a firm
is less prepared, it is less likely to get a loan. Thus, we employMan-
agerial time and Firm is main income (one if the owner reports that
firm is the main income source, zero otherwise) as our instruments
to control for loan preparation. If the firms are not the main income
source of the owners, they might not spend time on loan applica-
tion. This results in a lower probability of getting one. Managerial
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for whole sample and variable definition
Mean SD Obs. Definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Need 0.591 0.492 4,868 One if the firm reports a need of loan, zero otherwise
Formal loans
Apply 0.238 0.426 4,868 One if the firm applies for a formal loan, zero otherwise
Loan approval 0.933 0.249 1,157 One if the firm gets at least one formal loan, zero otherwise
Duration 1.423 1.246 1,083 Loan maturity (in years)
Interest 15.738 5.383 1,080 Annual interest rate charged (%)
Informal loans
Apply 0.540 0.498 4,869 One if the firm applies for an informal loan, zero otherwise
Loan approval 0.374 2.229 2,631 One if the firm gets at least one informal loan, zero otherwise
Duration 1.800 3.792 781 Loan maturity (in years)
Interest 8.499 16.108 780 Annual interest rate charged (%)
Business network 0.379 0.485 4,869 One if the firm has regular contacts with at least 20 business people and gets assistance from them in the last
three months; zero otherwise
Official network 0.331 0.471 4,869 One if the firm has regular contacts with at least ten bank officials or government officials and gets assistance
from them in the last three months; zero otherwise
Female 0.282 0.450 4,869 One if the owner is female, zero otherwise.
Age 50.063 9.864 4,869 Owner’s age (in years)
Veteran/Communist 0.020 0.141 4,869 One if the owner is a war veteran or a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise
Ethnicity 0.933 0.249 4,869 One if the owner belongs to ethnic majority, zero otherwise
Education 0.155 1.086 4,868 First component of principal component analysis of two variables: (1) basic education, which equals one if the
owner finishes high school, zero otherwise; and (2) professional education which equals one if the owner has
college or university degree, zero otherwise
Previous wage employee 0.462 0.499 4,869 One if the owner’s previous job is wage employee, zero otherwise
Bad credit history 0.037 0.189 3,166 One if the firm fails to service its debt, zero otherwise
ROA 0.201 0.213 4,869 Return on assets (%)
Firm age 17.544 9.808 4,867 Firm’s age (in years)
Size 7.020 1.530 4,869 Natural logarithm of firm’s assets measured in million VND
Export 0.043 0.203 4,856 One if the firm has direct export activity, zero otherwise
Accounting 0.288 0.453 4,869 One if the firm follows the accounting standard in accordance with government guidelines, zero otherwise
Notes: Columns (1)–(4) show mean, standard deviation, number of observations, and variable definition, respectively.
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time is the percentage of the owner’s working time spent each
month dealing with government regulations and officials. As man-
agerial time is limited, the owners who spend significant amounts
of time in dealing with government officials might not have
enough time to prepare all the formalities related to loan applica-
tions. Hence, they are less likely to obtain a formal loan (Muravyev
et al., 2009). Furthermore, lending corruption has remained in col-
lectivist societies, especially for small and medium enterprises (El
Ghoul, Guedhami, Chuck, Kwok, & Zheng, 2016; Zheng, El Ghoul,
Guedhami, & Kwok, 2013). Thus, we employ Bribe (one if the firm
pays informal fees, zero otherwise) as our third instrument and
argue that if a firm pays informal fees, the likelihood of loans being
approved is higher.
5. Results
(a) Gender, social capital, and financial constraints
Tables 3 and 4 report our regression results with Business net-
work and Official network as the indicator of social capital, respec-
tively. Column (1) shows the marginal effects estimated around
mean points for the differences in loan applications. Column (2)
shows the marginal effects estimated around mean points for the
differences in the outcomes of actual loan applicants, that is,
whether the loan applications are approved or rejected. The depen-
dent variables in columns (3) and (4) are loan duration and interest
rates charged, respectively. Conditional on the need for external
finance, we do not observe significant differences in the likelihood
of applying for formal loans between male- and female-owned
firms. However, firms with closer ties to government officials or
bankers are more likely to apply for bank loans. This supports
the argument that firms with better official relationships are
encouraged to apply for formal loans in the hope that they can
get loans due to these relationships. Furthermore, as expected,
firms that introduce new technology or new products need extra
funding for innovation while the need for finance would be
reduced by the internal finance generated from within the
household.
Regarding the differences in loan approvals, firms with female
ownership are more likely to obtain a formal loan compared to
firms with male ownership. More specifically, conditional on actual
loan applications, women-owned firms have a 33–42% higher
probability of getting loans than male-owned firms. This number
is statistically and economically significant. Regarding the
employed instrument in the selection equation, we observe that
firms are more likely to apply for loans from the informal sector
before applying for formal ones.
We also find significant differences in terms of interest rates
charged to male and female entrepreneurs, i.e., women pay 0.69
percentage points lower interest rates than men do. However,
there is no difference between the loan maturity terms given to
Table 2
Descriptive statistics by gender
MeanM SDM Obs. MeanF SDF Obs. MeanM MeanF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Need 0.613 0.487 3,495 0.533 0.499 1,373 0.080 ***
Formal loans
Apply 0.257 0.437 3,495 0.192 0.394 1,373 0.065 ***
Loan approval 0.925 0.263 895 0.962 0.192 262 0.037 **
Duration 1.394 1.232 830 1.517 1.287 253 0.123
Interest 15.890 5.384 829 15.236 5.360 251 0.654 *
Informal loans
Apply 0.554 0.497 3,496 0.505 0.500 1,373 0.049 ***
Loan approval 0.395 2.512 1,936 0.318 1.103 695 0.077
Duration 1.856 4.091 619 1.583 2.316 162 0.274
Interest 8.262 15.281 618 9.402 18.959 162 1.140
Business network 0.366 0.482 3,496 0.410 0.492 1,373 0.044 ***
Official network 0.338 0.473 3,496 0.312 0.464 1,373 0.026 *
Age 48.083 9.892 3,496 47.838 9.659 1,373 0.245
Veteran/Communist 0.025 0.157 3,496 0.008 0.089 1,373 0.017 ***
Ethnicity 0.941 0.235 3,496 0.913 0.281 1,373 0.028 ***
Education 0.098 1.041 3,495 0.299 1.181 1,373 0.200 ***
Previous wage employee 0.496 0.500 3,496 0.377 0.485 1,373 0.119 ***
Bad credit history 0.040 0.197 2,355 0.028 0.166 811 0.012
ROA 0.195 0.208 3,496 0.215 0.226 1,373 0.020 ***
Firm age 15.415 9.657 3,494 15.697 10.430 1,373 0.282
Size 7.084 1.504 3,496 6.859 1.582 1,373 0.225 ***
Export 0.044 0.205 3,485 0.041 0.198 1,371 0.003
Accounting 0.284 0.451 3,496 0.299 0.458 1,373 0.015
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics by gender. Columns (1)–(3) show mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for male-owned firms, respectively.
Columns (4)–(6) showmean, standard deviation, and number of observations for female-owned firms, respectively. Columns (7) shows mean difference between two groups.
‘Need’ equals one if the firm reports a need of loans, zero otherwise. ‘Apply’ equals one if the firm applies for a loan, zero otherwise. ‘Loan approval’ equals one if the firm gets
at least one loan, zero if all loan applications are rejected. ‘Duration’ is the loan maturity (in years) of the reported loan. ‘Interest’ is annual interest rate of the reported loan.
‘Business network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least 20 business people and gets assistance from them in the last three months; zero otherwise. ‘Official
network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least ten bank officials or government officials and gets assistance from them in the last three months; zero
otherwise. ‘Veteran/Communist’ equals one if the owner is a war veteran or a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise. ‘Ethnicity’ equals one if the owner belongs to
ethnic majority, zero otherwise. ‘Education’ is the first component of principal component analysis of two variables: (1) basic education, which equals one if the owner
finishes high school, zero otherwise; and (2) professional education, which equals one if the owner has college or university degree, zero otherwise. ‘Previous wage employee’
equals one if the owner’s previous job is waged employee, zero otherwise. ‘ROA’ is return on assets. ‘Age’ is the owner’s age (by the survey year). ‘Firm age’ is the firm’s age (by
the survey year). ‘Size’ is the natural logarithm of firms’ assets measured in million VND. ‘Export’ equals one if the firm has direct export activity, zero otherwise. ‘Accounting’
equals one if the firm follows the accounting standard in accordance with government guidelines, zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance for t-tests of mean equality
of two groups at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Figure 2. Distribution of interest rates charged to male-owned and female-owned firms. Notes: This figure shows the distribution of interest rates charged to male-owned
and female-owned firms. Panel A shows the distribution of formal interest rates. Panel B shows the distribution of informal interest rates.
Figure 3. Sources of informal loans. Notes: This figure shows the proportions of informal loan sources from which male-owned and female-owned firms borrow.
236 T. Pham, O. Talavera /World Development 102 (2018) 228–242
male- and female-owned firms. Interestingly, although better
social capital does not guarantee a bank loan for firms, relation-
ships with government officials and other business people may
help firms get longer loan terms. In other words, we do find sup-
port for the roles of social capital in relaxing financial constraints.
Regarding the employed instrument, if the owners spend more
time on dealing with government officials, they have less time to
prepare for loan applications, resulting in a lower probability of
getting a loan.
Overall, our results provide no evidence for gender differences
in loan applications. This might be explained by entrepreneurs’
ability to get zero interest-rate loans from families and friends.
Consequently, business owners, regardless of gender, do not have
incentives to seek formal credits. It could also be the case that the
gender non-difference is driven by the lower number of loan
applications made by female entrepreneurs. Women often do
not consider themselves as entrepreneurs (Verheul, Uhlaner, &
Thurik, 2005) or perceive themselves and the entrepreneurial
Table 3
Gender discrimination, business network, and access to finance
Apply Loan approval Duration Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.011 0.329** 0.049 0.687*
(0.070) (0.142) (0.058) (0.365)
Business network 0.059 0.001 0.085* 0.099
(0.062) (0.119) (0.047) (0.292)
Female  Business network 0.035 0.011 0.035 0.357
(0.056) (0.154) (0.045) (0.281)
Ethnicity 0.281 0.271 0.305* 0.370
(0.174) (0.335) (0.164) (1.022)
Education 0.021 0.030 0.023 0.021
(0.032) (0.072) (0.025) (0.155)
Bad credit history 0.227 0.468** 0.104 0.088
(0.152) (0.203) (0.096) (0.595)
Veteran/Communist 0.457** 0.019 0.065 0.770
(0.208) (0.330) (0.131) (0.805)
ROA 0.264 0.170 0.012 0.011
(0.173) (0.321) (0.126) (0.789)
Age 0.157 0.154 0.078 0.665
(0.168) (0.296) (0.119) (0.743)
Firm age 0.027 0.013 0.030 0.095
(0.048) (0.089) (0.037) (0.230)
Size 0.237*** 0.103 0.069*** 0.298**
(0.041) (0.069) (0.023) (0.142)
Export 0.160 0.428** 0.040 0.218
(0.128) (0.210) (0.087) (0.543)
Accounting 0.151* 0.167 0.044 0.301
(0.082) (0.182) (0.064) (0.398)
Selection equation instruments
Need Apply Loan approval Loan approval
Innovation 0.191***
(0.064)
Share of jobs 0.140**
(0.061)
Apply for informal loan 0.801***
(0.073)
Firm is main income 0.013 0.010
(0.366) (0.365)
Managerial time 0.068** 0.067**
(0.033) (0.033)
Bribe 0.017 0.023
(0.203) (0.203)
Observations 3,102 2,254 2,247 2,249
Notes: This table presents regressions results with sample selection. Social capital is indicated by ‘Business network’. Regressions in columns (1) and (2) are estimated using
Heckprobit estimation while regressions in column (3) and (4) are estimated using Heckman’s estimations. Marginal effects estimated around mean points are reported in
Columns (1) and (2). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions, a constant term, sector, region, and time dummies are included but not reported.
‘Need’ equals one if the firm reports a need of loans, zero otherwise. ‘Apply’ equals one if the firm applies for a loan, zero otherwise. ‘Loan approval’ equals one if the firm gets
at least one loan, zero if all loan applications are rejected. ‘Duration’ is the natural logarithm of the reported loan’s duration in months. ‘Interest’ is annual interest rate of the
reported loan. ‘Business network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least 20 business people and gets assistance from them in the last three months; zero
otherwise. ‘Official network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least ten bank officials or government officials and gets assistance from them in the last three
months; zero otherwise. ‘Veteran/Communist’ equals one if the owner is a war veteran or a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise. ‘Ethnicity’ equals one if the
owner belongs to ethnic majority, zero otherwise. ‘Education’ is the first component of principal component analysis of two variables: (1) basic education, which equals one if
the owner finishes high school, zero otherwise; and (2) professional education, which equals one if the owner has college or university degree, zero otherwise. ‘Previous wage
employee’ equals one if the owner’s previous job is waged employee, zero otherwise. ‘ROA’ is return on assets. ‘Age’ is the natural logarithm of owners’ age (by the survey
year). ‘Firm age’ is the natural logarithm of firm’s age (by the survey year). ‘Size’ is the natural logarithm of firms’ assets measured in million VND. ‘Export’ equals one if the
firm has direct export activity, zero otherwise. ‘Accounting’ equals one if the firm follows the accounting standard in accordance with government guidelines, zero otherwise.
‘Apply for informal loan’ is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm applies for an informal loan, zero otherwise. ‘Share of jobs’ is the ratio of number of jobs over total
number of working-age adults in the household. ‘Innovation’ is a dummy that equals one if the firm has introduced new technology or new product, zero otherwise. ‘Firm is
main income’ is a dummy that equals one if the owner reports that firm is the main income source, zero otherwise. ‘Managerial time’ is the percentage of working time spent
on dealing with government regulations and officials. ‘Bribe’ is a dummy that equals one if the firm pays informal fees, zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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environment in a less positive light than men (Langowitz &
Minniti, 2007). As a result, female entrepreneurs tend to have a
lower level of entrepreneurial activity that might demotivate
them to seek additional capital. In addition, women are more
likely to be risk averse due to gender-specific characteristics
(Dwyer et al., 2002) or due to the economic conditions and the
non-economic goals in running business (Herslund & Tanvig,
2012; Murthy & Gopinath, 2013). Thus, they are less likely to
apply for bank loans.
Further, we find that better social capital could assist entrepre-
neurial activities through relaxing financial constraints. This sup-
ports the literature on the positive impact of the number and
strength of social ties on firm-founding activities (e.g., Kreiser,
Patel, & Fiet, 2013). One possible explanation is that, due to infor-
mation asymmetry, banks tend to seek additional information
about the firms through firms’ social networks. Therefore, better
social ties may facilitate loan applications (Tenev et al., 2003).
Another possible explanation is that social networks are beneficial
Table 4
Gender discrimination, official network, and access to finance
Apply Loan approval Duration Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.039 0.421*** 0.041 0.529
(0.074) (0.154) (0.056) (0.360)
Official network 0.241*** 0.030 0.105* 0.242
(0.072) (0.117) (0.061) (0.393)
Female  Official network 0.165*** 0.247 0.014 0.466
(0.059) (0.185) (0.050) (0.322)
Ethnicity 0.349* 0.363 0.115 0.775
(0.183) (0.339) (0.155) (0.984)
Education 0.028 0.011 0.031 0.020
(0.033) (0.073) (0.024) (0.156)
Bad credit history 0.234 0.495** 0.029 0.431
(0.155) (0.202) (0.091) (0.581)
Veteran/Communist 0.440** 0.052 0.001 0.749
(0.208) (0.335) (0.140) (0.892)
ROA 0.287 0.200 0.018 0.045
(0.177) (0.332) (0.127) (0.818)
Age 0.124 0.082 0.090 0.161
(0.169) (0.308) (0.121) (0.777)
Firm age 0.037 0.029 0.019 0.066
(0.049) (0.093) (0.035) (0.227)
Size 0.243*** 0.100 0.031 0.024
(0.040) (0.068) (0.045) (0.290)
Export 0.146 0.484** 0.080 0.559
(0.130) (0.218) (0.080) (0.514)
Accounting 0.135 0.148 0.026 0.127
(0.083) (0.183) (0.064) (0.409)
Selection equation instruments
Need Apply Loan approval Loan approval
Innovation 0.161**
(0.067)
Share of jobs 0.140**
(0.063)
Apply for informal loan 0.846***
(0.075)
Firm is main income 0.010 0.007
(0.365) (0.364)
Managerial time 0.059* 0.058*
(0.033) (0.033)
Bribe 0.004 0.008
(0.199) (0.199)
Observations 3,102 2,254 978 979
Notes: This table presents regression results with sample selection. Social capital is indicated by ‘Official network’. Regressions in columns (1) and (2) are estimated using
Heckprobit estimations while regressions in columns (3) and (4) are estimated using Heckman’s estimations. Marginal effects estimated around mean points are reported in
Columns (1) and (2). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions, a constant term, sector, region, and time dummies are included but not reported.
‘Need’ equals one if the firm reports a need of loans, zero otherwise. ‘Apply’ equals one if the firm applies for a loan, zero otherwise. ‘Loan approval’ equals one if the firm gets
at least one loan, zero if all loan applications are rejected. ‘Duration’ is the natural logarithm of the reported loan’s duration in months. ‘Interest’ is annual interest rate of the
reported loan. ‘Business network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least 20 business people and gets assistance from them in the last three months; zero
otherwise. ‘Official network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least ten bank officials or government officials and gets assistance from them in the last three
months; zero otherwise. ‘Veteran/Communist’ equals one if the owner is a war veteran or a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise. ‘Ethnicity’ equals one if the
owner belongs to ethnic majority, zero otherwise. ‘Education’ is the first component of principal component analysis of two variables: (1) basic education, which equals one if
the owner finishes high school, zero otherwise; and (2) professional education, which equals one if the owner has college or university degree, zero otherwise. ‘Previous wage
employee’ equals one if the owner’s previous job is waged employee, zero otherwise. ‘ROA’ is return on assets. ‘Age’ is the natural logarithm of owners’ age (by the survey
year). ‘Firm age’ is the natural logarithm of firm’s age (by the survey year). ‘Size’ is the natural logarithm of firms’ assets measured in million VND. ‘Export’ equals one if the
firm has direct export activity, zero otherwise. ‘Accounting’ equals one if the firm follows the accounting standard in accordance with government guidelines, zero otherwise.
‘Apply for informal loan’ is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm applies for an informal loan, zero otherwise. ‘Share of jobs’ is the ratio of number of jobs over total
number of working-age adults in the household. ‘Innovation’ is a dummy that equals one if the firm has introduced new technology or new product, zero otherwise. ‘Firm is
main income’ is a dummy that equals one if the owner reports that firm is the main income source, zero otherwise. ‘Managerial time’ is the percentage of working time spent
on dealing with government regulations and officials. ‘Bribe’ is a dummy that equals one if the firm pays informal fees, zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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to all network members in terms of widening and combining social
ties as well as collective learning within networks (Lehto & Oksa,
2004). All these above factors could make firms better off in apply-
ing for loans.
An additional finding is that women are more likely to obtain a
loan with more favorable terms. We interpret this result in a num-
ber of ways. First, although it is not evident in our data, previous
studies document that women are more likely to become social
rather than commercial entrepreneurs (e.g., Estrin, Mickiewicz, &
Stephan, 2013). Following the revised Vietnam’s Enterprise Law
in 2014, social entrepreneurs could get support from the govern-
ment in obtaining funding. Taken together, it could explain why
Vietnamese female-owned firms can get better loan deals. Second,
social networks, especially networks related to economic institu-
tions, are more likely to be male-biased (Stenbacka & Tillberg
Mattsson, 2009). Thus, female entrepreneurs might benefit from
male–female partnering by accessing male entrepreneurs’ net-
works (Godwin et al., 2006).
In terms of the impacts of other owners’ characteristics and
firms’ characteristics, most results are consistent with expecta-
tions, i.e., firms whose owners are war veterans or Communist
Party members, or firms that follow the accounting standard are
encouraged to apply for bank loans. Bigger firms are also more
likely to apply for loans but are more likely to get less favorable
loan terms with shorter loan duration terms and higher interest
rates. Firms that failed to repay debts in the past have poor credit
records and are less likely to get new loans. Interestingly, export
firms are less likely to get loans. This may be explained by the fact
that export firms are not on the list of SMEs that can apply for
favorable credit programs provided by state-owned banks.
(b) Robustness checks
Since sample selection bias remains one of the key challenges in
studies about discrimination in lending markets, it is difficult to
find a good instrument. One might argue that the instrument Share
of jobs, employed in the model consisting of Eqns. (1.1), (1.2), could
also affect the likelihood of applying for a bank loan. To check this
possibility, we add this variable as another instrument in Eqn. (2.2)
and perform Heckman’s regressions. The results reported in Table 5
show that the coefficients on this instrument are statistically
insignificant in the selection equation, while the effect of gender
on loan approval is consistent with our main results.
Since paying bribes may also help firms to get better loan deals,
the use of this variable as an instrument in Eqn. (3.2) might be
invalid. To rule out this possibility, we add this variable into Eqn.
(3.1) and re-estimate the Heckman estimations. The results
reported in Table 6 are quantitatively consistent with previous
findings. That is, interest rates charged to females are lower than
those charged to males and social capital helps firms to get longer
loan maturity terms. Moreover, the coefficients on Bribe are statis-
tically insignificant, suggesting little evidence for lending corrup-
tion in the sample.
6. Conclusions and implications
In recent years, the number of SMEs in Viet Nam as well as their
role in the development of the economy has been growing. How-
ever, SMEs in Viet Nam still face some obstacles, particularly in
relation to access to finance. Further, because of gender differences,
SMEs with female ownership might face more difficulties in raising
external capital compared to their male-owned counterparts. Thus,
the main aim of this paper is to explore the issues relating to
female-owned SMEs’ access to finance in Viet Nam, i.e., whether
female-owned firms are discriminated in lending markets. Since
Viet Nam is a network-oriented economy (Meyer & Nguyen,
2005), this paper also investigates the role of social capital on
access to credit. Given that there could be gender differences in
social capital and networking ability (e.g., Aldrich, 1989), we fur-
ther document the interaction between the social capital and firm
Table 5
Robustness check: Share of job as an instrument in selection equation in loan approval
model
Loan approval Loan approval
(1) (2)
Female 0.341** 0.418***
(0.143) (0.157)
Business network 0.054
(0.120)
Female  Business network 0.003
(0.150)
Official network 0.006
(0.119)
Female  Official network 0.249
(0.183)
Ethnicity 0.242 0.326
(0.324) (0.335)
Education 0.047 0.033
(0.071) (0.074)
Bad credit history 0.479** 0.500**
(0.199) (0.203)
Veteran/Communist 0.036 0.071
(0.330) (0.338)
ROA 0.098 0.119
(0.333) (0.338)
Age 0.071 0.010
(0.298) (0.309)
Firm age 0.009 0.010
(0.086) (0.092)
Size 0.093 0.096
(0.067) (0.069)
Export 0.468** 0.520**
(0.212) (0.221)
Accounting 0.197 0.169
(0.179) (0.185)
Selection equation instruments
Apply Apply
Apply for informal loan 0.803*** 0.846***
(0.074) (0.075)
Share of jobs 0.072 0.083
(0.071) (0.072)
Observations 2,226 2,226
Notes: This table presents robustness checks for loan approval model. Regressions
are estimated using Heckprobit estimations. Marginal effects estimated around
mean points are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all
regressions, a constant term, sector, region, and time dummies are included but not
reported. ‘Apply’ equals one if the firm applies for a loan, zero otherwise. ‘Loan
approval’ equals one if the firm gets at least one loan, zero if all loan applications are
rejected. ‘Business network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least
20 business people and gets assistance from them in the last three months; zero
otherwise. ‘Official network’ equals one if the firm has regular contact with at least
ten bank officials or government officials and gets assistance from them in the last
three months; zero otherwise. ‘Veteran/Communist’ equals one if the owner is a
war veteran or a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise. ‘Ethnicity’ equals
one if the owner belongs to ethnic majority, zero otherwise. ‘Education’ is the first
component of principal component analysis of two variables: (1) basic education,
which equals one if the owner finishes high school, zero otherwise; and (2) ‘pro-
fessional education’ which equals one if the owner has college or university degree,
zero otherwise. ‘Previous wage employee’ equals one if the owner’s previous job is
waged employee, zero otherwise. ‘ROA’ is return on assets. ‘Age’ is the natural
logarithm of the owner’s age (by the survey year). ‘Firm age’ is the natural logarithm
of firm’s age (by the survey year). ‘Size’ is the natural logarithm of firms’ assets
measured in million VND. ‘Export’ equals one if the firm has direct export activity,
zero otherwise. ‘Accounting’ equals one if the firm follows the accounting standard
in accordance with government guidelines, zero otherwise. ‘Apply for informal loan’
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm applies for an informal loan, zero
otherwise. ‘Share of jobs’ is the ratio of number of jobs over total number of
working-age adults in the household. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
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ownership to test the interrelationship among gender, social
networks, and bank financing.
We employ data from the 2011, 2013, and 2015 results of the
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Survey in Viet Nam in our
analysis. The problems of sample selection bias are addressed by
employing the Heckman sample-correction methodology. Particu-
larly, we use the Heckman regressions to distinguish the dispari-
ties in: (1) probability of applying for formal loans; (2) loan
approval between actual loan borrowers and discouraged borrow-
ers; and (3) loan conditions between successful borrowers and
unsuccessful borrowers. In contrast to our expectations, we do
not observe the disparity in the number of loan applications made
by female- and male-owned firms. This finding could be explained
by two reasons. Firstly, entrepreneurs tend to borrow from the
informal sector before borrowing from formal credit institutions.
Secondly, women entrepreneurs might not apply for bank loans
due to their risk-averse behavior (Herslund & Tanvig, 2012) or
firm-specific characteristics (Estrin et al., 2013). Thus, gender dif-
ferences in the number of formal loan applications might not be
observed.
We also find that the likelihood of female-owned firms obtain-
ing a bank loan is higher than the male-owned ones. Moreover,
interest rates charged to female-owned firms are lower than the
ones charged to male-owned firms. Regarding the impact of social
capital, firms with closer relationships with government and bank
officials are encouraged to apply for bank loans. While there is no
evidence that these firms can get bank loans, a good relationship
with officials and other business people may help firms to obtain
Table 6
Robustness check: Impact of Bribe on loan terms
Duration Duration Interest Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.049 0.099 0.687* 0.619
(0.058) (0.067) (0.365) (0.402)
Business network 0.081* 0.099
(0.047) (0.293)
Female  Business network 0.035 0.357
(0.045) (0.281)
Official network 0.052 0.382
(0.046) (0.273)
Female  Official network 0.052 0.142
(0.045) (0.268)
Ethnicity 0.298* 0.294* 0.370 0.373
(0.163) (0.171) (1.023) (1.019)
Education 0.023 0.026 0.021 0.023
(0.025) (0.026) (0.155) (0.156)
Bad credit history 0.103 0.132 0.088 0.081
(0.096) (0.100) (0.595) (0.594)
Veteran/Communist 0.071 0.071 0.769 0.813
(0.131) (0.137) (0.806) (0.809)
ROA 0.015 0.023 0.012 0.058
(0.126) (0.132) (0.789) (0.793)
Age 0.077 0.091 0.665 0.593
(0.119) (0.125) (0.743) (0.746)
Firm age 0.030 0.034 0.095 0.092
(0.037) (0.039) (0.230) (0.231)
Size 0.070*** 0.057** 0.298** 0.294**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.142) (0.141)
Export 0.041 0.020 0.218 0.261
(0.087) (0.091) (0.543) (0.544)
Accounting 0.031 0.050 0.302 0.266
(0.065) (0.068) (0.406) (0.409)
Bribe 0.052 0.053 0.003 0.078
(0.053) (0.056) (0.331) (0.335)
Selection equation instruments
Loan approval Loan approval Loan approval Loan approval
Firm is main income 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.007
(0.366) (0.365) (0.365) (0.364)
Managerial time 0.068** 0.059* 0.067** 0.058*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 978 978 979 979
Notes: This table presents robustness checks for loan terms model. Regressions in columns (1)–(4) are estimated using Heckman estimations. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. In all regressions, a constant term, sector, region, and time dummies are estimated but not reported. ‘Loan approval’ equals one if the firm gets at
least one loan, zero if all loan applications are rejected. ‘Duration’ is the natural logarithm of the reported loan’s duration in months. ‘Interest’ is annual interest rate of the
reported loan. ‘Business network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least 20 business people and gets assistance from them in the last three months; zero
otherwise. ‘Official network’ equals one if the firm has regular contacts with at least ten bank officials or government officials and gets assistance from them in the last three
months; zero otherwise. ‘Veteran/Communist’ equals one if the owner is a war veteran or a member of the Communist Party, zero otherwise. ‘Ethnicity’ equals one if the
owner belongs to ethnic majority, zero otherwise. ‘Education’ is the first component of principal component analysis of two variables: (1) basic education, which equals one if
the owner finishes high school, zero otherwise; and (2) ‘professional education’ which equals one if the owner has college or university degree, zero otherwise. ‘Previous wage
employee’ equals one if the owner’s previous job is waged employee, zero otherwise. ‘ROA’ is return on assets. ‘Age’ is the natural logarithm of owners’ age (by the survey
year). ‘Firm age’ is the natural logarithm of firm’s age (by the survey year). ‘Size’ is the natural logarithm of firm’s assets measured in million VND. ‘Export’ equals one if the
firm has direct export activity, zero otherwise. ‘Accounting’ equals one if the firm follows the accounting standard in accordance with government guidelines, zero otherwise.
‘Firm is main income’ is a dummy that equals one if the owner reports that firm is the main income source, zero otherwise. ‘Managerial time’ is the percentage of working
time spent on dealing with government regulations and officials. ‘Bribe’ is a dummy that equals one if the firms pay informal fees, zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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better deals. Our estimates could be explained by the effects of
social capital and female–male partnership. Particularly, better
social capital can help firms get better loan conditions as bankers
tend to search for extra information about loan applicants through
their social ties (Tenev et al., 2003). However, business and official
networks are likely to be male-biased. Hence, it could be the case
that women entrepreneurs do not benefit from their own social
capital but from the heterogeneous networks of their male busi-
ness partners (Godwin et al., 2006).
These results provide some policy and practice implications.
More specifically, firms could make use of their ties with govern-
ment and bank officials as well as their relationship with other
business people to get better loan terms. In addition, female entre-
preneurs should extend their partnership with male counterparts
to get the most benefit from the social networks. Furthermore, cur-
rent credit programs with favorable terms targeting SMES are lim-
ited to some specific sectors and provinces. Therefore, credit
programs should be open to all SMEs in all sectors while loans with
favorable terms (e.g., lower interest rates or longer maturity) could
be extended.
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